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ABSTRACT
Macroeconomic shocks and labour-market institutions jointly determine employment growth
and economic performance. The effect of shocks depends on the nature of these institutions
and the effect of institutional change depends on the macroeconomic environment. It follows
that a given set of institutions may be appropriate in one epoch and not in another. We
derive a dynamic model of labour demand in which the effect of firing costs on labour
demand depends on the macroeconomic environment: When the level of macroeconomic
activity is expected to drop and/or the trend rate of productivity growth is small, a rise in
firing costs affects mainly (and adversely) the hiring decision and not the layoff decision. This
makes firing costs harmful to employment when it may appear most appropriate. In contrast,
firing costs can raise employment during periods of high growth and postive shocks. Our
hypothesis is supported by empirical results using OECD data.
Keywords: Firing costs, stochastic demand, hiring and firing, real options.
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Labour-market rigidities are often blamed for the European unemployment problem in what
is commonly termed “Eurosclerosis1”. Recent studies by the OECD link reforms to reduce
labour-market rigidies2 to reductions in unemployment (e.g. Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta
(1998) and OECD (2000)). This line of argument – according to which rigidities such as
firing costs discourage firms from employment – has become increasingly persuasive over
the past two decades, as the EU unemployment rate has risen steadily relative to the US
rate. However, it then becomes a mystery why the EU unemployment rate was about half
the US rate throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s, even though job-security legislation3
and other impediments to hiring and firing have been more stringent in Europe throughout the
postwar period. Thus it appears that there is no simple inverse relation between labour-
market rigidities and unemployment. Instead, it seems that these rigidities might promote
employment in some circumstances and reduce it in others.
A partial rationale for this possibility is provided by recent work by Phelps (1994),
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps and Zoega (2000) and Phelps and
Zoega (2001) who show – both theoretically as well as empirically – how a high level of
unemployment benefits, a long duration of these benefits, a high density and coverage of
labour unions, and employment-protection legislation – which takes the form of a fixed cost
of firing – determine the employment effects of macroeconomic shocks. Prominent among
these shocks are changes in the rate of productivity growth (Pissarides, 1990; Hoon and
Phelps, 1997), changes in real oil prices (Carruth et al., 1998), and changes in world real
interest rates (Phelps, 1994). Diaz and Snower (1996) show how the employment effects of
firing and hiring costs depend on the persistence of macroeconomic shocks. A recent paper
by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) shows how an increase in economic turbulance – arising
from the restructuring from manufacturing to service industries and the adoption of new
                                                
1 See Giersch (1985).
2 The actual rules and regulations that affect the relationship between employers and employees in the
OECD concern administrative authorizations, minimum-notice periods, severence pay, unfair dismissals
and restrictions on layoffs for economic reasons.  In our analysis, we will summarise this employment-
protection legislation with one summary index of firing costs.
3 One rationale for these restrictions is that they internalise the social costs of dismissing a worker –
hence the cost of reallocating him to a new sector – and therefore cause firms to take these external
considerations into account when deciding on a dismissal (Lindbeck and Snower (1988), Booth and
Zoega (1994)). There is the added benefit that to the extent that average tenure becomes longer, both
workers and firms may be more willing to invest in general – as well as firm-specific – skills.
technologies – in conjunction with high unemployment benefits can contribute to persistently
high unemployment.
In this paper, by contrast, we show how the employment effects of firing costs depend
on the rate of productivity growth and the likelihood of large-scale recessions (i.e. the
probability of adverse demand shocks). In particular, we show that firing costs may have no
deleterious employment effects – and might even stimulate employment – if productivity
grows sufficiently fast and the likelihood of major recessions is low. These are conditions
that, on the whole, prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. Subsequently, however, in the 1970s
and 1980s, productivity growth slowed down and the likelihood of major recessions rose
(particularly in conjunction with oil price and other raw material price shocks). We show
that under these adverse conditions, firing costs can have a severely contractionary effect on
employment, leading to high unemployment.
Our analysis differs from that of Bertola (1990) in that he shows that firms tend to
demand less labour in good times and more labour in bad times with the result that
employment is more stable where employment protection is more stringent. In contrast, we
show how medium-term macroeconomic factors – i.e. the trend rate of growth of labour
productivity and the possibility of adverse demand shocks – determine the effectiveness of
firing costs which implies that firing costs may raise or lower average employment depending
on the macroeconomic environment.
Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and Bertola (1990) demonstrate how the asymmetry of
adjustment costs – that is hiring- and firing costs – the rate of time discounting and the
expected rate of attrition affect the long-run bias in firms’ employment policies. We do not
dispute their theoretical insights but we show how the effectiveness of firing costs depends in
addition on the stochastic, macroeconomic environment in which firms operate. Thus raising
firing costs may raise average employment in one country while reducing it in others.
Moreover, Bertola (1990) finds no empirical support for an adverse effect of firing costs on
average employment. We show that once the interactions between firing costs and the
macroeconomic environment are taken into account, we can detect a signfificant relationship
– positive or negative depending on the circumstances – between firing costs and average
unemployment in a pooled sample of OECD countries.
In Section I we derive a theoretical model of hiring and firing when labour is a quasi-fixed
asset (see Oi, 1962) and there are linear, asymmetric costs of hiring and firing. In Section II
we show how a change in the macroeconomic environment from high productivity growth
and positive expected demand shocks to low growth and negative expected demand shocks
will make firing costs harmful to employment. Finally, in Section III, we look at data on
unemployment and labour-market institutions for 19 OECD countries and conclude that the
predictions of our model are consonant with the data.
I. Model
We consider the behaviour of a representative firm which finds itself facing stochastic
demand for its output and linear costs of hiring and firing workers. We model the firm’s
hiring and firing decisions by deriving the two thresholds at which hiring and firing become
optimal.4 Both of these decisions may be interpreted as intertemporal investment decisions.
The firm has a linear production technology (1) and faces a linear output demand function
(2)
Q gN= ,                                                          (1)
P Z bQ= - ,                                                       (2)
where Q denotes production and sales, N is the size of the firm’s workforce, g is labour
productivity, P is the product price, and Z is an additive demand parameter. The number of
employees quitting is
dN N dt= -d                                                       (3)
where d is the quit rate. Labour productivity grows at the exponential rate hg
dg g dtg=  h ,                                                        (4)
and the demand parameter Z follows a combined geometric Brownian motion and jump
process;
21 ZdqZdqZdZdtdZ ZZ +-+= vsh                                    (5)
where v  is a Wiener process; dtd ev =   (since e is a normally distributed random
variable with mean zero and a standard deviation of unity), hZ  is the drift parameter and
                                                
4 For simplicity, we ignore inventories and the possibility of temporary layoffs.
s Z  the variance parameter, dq1 and dq1 are the increments of Poisson processes (with
mean arrival rates l1 and l2), and dq1, dq1 and dv  are independent to each other (so that
E(dwdq1)=0, E(dwdq2)=0, and E(dq1dq2)=0). It is assumed that if an “event 1” (or “event
2”) occurs, q1 (or q2) falls (or increases) by some fixed percentage f1 (or f2) with
probability 1. Thus equation (5) implies that product demand will behave as a geometric
Brownian motion, but over each time interval dt there is a small probability l1dt (or l2dt)
that it will drop (or rise) to 1-f1 (or 1+f2) times its original value, and it will then continue
fluctuating until another event occurs.
We model expectations about the future through the parameters sZ, l1, l2, f1, f2 and
hZ.. When sZ is large, there is much uncertainty about the future. When l1 (or l2) is positive
and large, we expect large discrete negative (positive) shocks. We are interested in testing
the implications of different parameter configurations for the effect of firing costs on average
employment.
Combining (1) and (2) gives
22NbggZNQP -=× .                                           (6)
The firm's revenue function is concave in labour productivity and employment.
The firm faces a hiring cost T per new employee and a firing cost F per dismissed
worker. If the worker quits, the firm bears no firing cost. We view F as a summary indicator
of the strictness of employment-protection legislation. However, we must note that such
restrictions have multiple dimensions that are not captured in our simple framework.5
The real wage w is assumed to grow at the same rate as productivity hg. In contrast, we
assume that discrete jumps in demand are not reflected in the wage. This assumes the
existence of real-wage rigidity which makes labour-demand shocks affect employment and
not real wages. Importantly, we do not model the effect of firing costs on wages. In this we
are supported by the empirical results of Bertola (1990) who shows – using a cross section
of ten OECD countries – that firing costs did not prevent wages from adjusting following the
oil-price shocks of the 1970s.
Using Itô's Lemma, the Bellman equation for the value ( )V Z g N, ,  of the firm’s stock of
workers at time zero, in the continuation region is
                                                
5 See footnote 1.
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where the value of future hires or fires is not taken into account and r is the real rate of
interest. The first term on the right-hand side is revenue, wN is the wage bill, dNVN is the
loss due to quits, hggVg is the gain due to productivity growth, and the last three terms are
the change in the value of the firm caused by changes in demand.
To find the value of the marginal employed worker, we take the derivative of (7) with
respect to N
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where ( )v Z g N, ,  is the value of employing the marginal worker. The solution for
( )v Z g N, ,  consists of the particular integral and the complementary function. The particular
integral, which is the expected present value of the marginal employed worker, is6
( ) wKNbgKgZKNgZv P 3221 2,, --= ,                              (9)
where
( ) 122111 ----++= zgK hhflfldr ,
( )K g2
1
2 2= + -
-
r d h ,
( ) 13 --+= gK hdr                         (10)
are the three discount factors.
The firm’s option value of hiring in the future and its option value of firing once the
worker is employed are measured by the complementary function:
( )
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6 In particular, the particular integral may be expressed as
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0
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which reduces to equation (9) in the absence of hiring and firing.
Letting vG  be the value of the marginal option, the general solutions for the hiring and firing
options have the following forms respectively (see Appendix I),
( ) ( )v Z g N A gZHG , , = 1 1
b
,                                           (12)
( ) ( )v Z g N A gZFG , , = 2 2
b
,                                           (13)
where b1 and b2 are the positive and negative roots of the following characteristic equation:
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )drflflbhbhbbs bb +--++---++- 11111
2
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gZZ    (14)
To satisfy the boundary conditions that ( ) 0,,0 =NgvGH  and ( )NgvGF ,,¥  = 0, we use the
positive solution for vH
G  and the negative solution for vF
G .
The value of the marginal, employed worker is equal to the sum of v P  and vF
G  in the
continuation region. In order to derive the two thresholds for hiring and firing, we then
compare the value of the worker to the direct and indirect costs of hiring (firing) the
workers. The definitions of the hiring and firing barriers, ZH  and ZF , are given by the
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions below. According to the value-matching
conditions the firm would find it optimal to exercise its option to hire or fire the marginal
worker once Z hits one of the two barriers:
( ) ( ) 12 123221 2 bb HHH gZATgZAwKNbgKgZK +=+-- ,            (15)
[ ] ( ) ( ) 21 213221 2 bb FFF gZAFgZAwKNbgKgZK +=+--- ,          (16)
where T and F denote hiring and firing costs respectively. The left-hand sides of (15) and
(16) show the marginal benefit from hiring/firing a worker and the right-hand sides the
marginal costs.
The marginal benefit of hiring a worker is equal to the sum of the present discounted
value of his productivity net of wages and the value of the option to fire him. The firm’s
ability to fire raises the benefit from employing a worker. The marginal cost of hiring is the
sum of the direct hiring costs and the sacrificed option to hire him in the future. By hiring a
worker today, the opportunity to do so in the future – when conditions may be more
favourable – is sacrificed.
Similarly, by firing a worker, the opportunity to do so in the future – when demand
conditions may be even more adverse – is sacrificed, and the opportunity to hire him again is
gained. The value of the two options depends on expectations about changes in demand.
The option to hire is valuable if firms expect demand to increase in the future, while the
option to fire is the more important if they expect it to fall.
The smooth-pasting conditions ensure that hiring (firing) is not optimal either before nor
after the hiring- (firing) theshold is reached.
K g A Z g A Z gH H1 2 2
1
1 1
12 2 1 1+ =- -b bb b b b ,                               (17)
 - + =- -K g A Z g A Z gH H1 1 1
1
2 2
11 1 2 2b bb b b b .                              (18)
Equations (15), (16), (17) and (18) form a non-linear system of equations with four
unknown parameters, Z A AH F, , Z   and 1 2 , and can be solved for numerically once the
solutions for b1 and b2 are found from (14). The thresholds for hiring and firing a marginal
worker can be found once numerical values for ZH  and ZF  are known.
II. Macroeconomic factors
We now use the model above to examine how the employment effect of firing costs depends
on productivity growth and the probability of adverse demand shocks. According to our
stylized account, most OECD countries experienced substantially higher productivity growth
and substantially lower probability of adverse demand shocks in the 1950s and 1960s than
subsequently in the 1970s and 1980s. We examine whether these secular changes could
have affected the role firing costs play in promoting or hampering production and
employment activity.
Accordingly, let us consider three scenarios. First, we let productivity grow at 2.5% per
annum while the (net) probability of adverse demand shocks is kept at zero. We take this
benchmark scenario as the analogue to the economic situation in many OECD countries
during the 1950s and 1960s. Second, we consider the case of a 20% probability of a large
downturn and a 5% probability of a positive jump in demand ( )Z ZH F' ' and – where the
size of the jumps is equal – while productivity growth remains at 2.5%. We call this the
downturn scenario. Finally, we let productivity growth slow down to 1% while ignoring the
possibility of demand shocks. This is the low-productivity-growth scenario. The last two
scenarios – corresponding to low growth and a possibility of adverse demand shocks – are
intended to throw light on the effect of changes in the macroeconomic environment between
the 1960s, on the one hand, and the 1970s and 1980s, on the other hand.
We want to measure the effectiveness of raising firing costs under the three alternative
scenarios. We start by defining what is meant by effectivenss:
Definition: The effectiveness of a given change in the level of firing costs is defined as the
change in the level of the firing- (and hiring) threshold caused by a change in the level of the
firing costs, given the values of the model’s parameters.
Figure 1 illustrates how the employment effects of firing costs depend on anticipations of
cyclical downturns. In particular, it shows the effects of firing costs on the hiring- and the
firing thresholds under the benchmark and downturn scenarios. Note that the thresholds
have been normalised to start at the same value.
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Figure 1. The downturn scenario. The effect of firing costs
on the hiring- and firing thresholds with parameters corresponding
to a no-supply-shock period (l1 = l2 = 0, sZ =0.12) and a supply-
shock period (l1 = 0.20, l2 = 0.05, f1 = f2 = 0.3, sZ =0.01).
Other parameters: hg =0.025. hZ =0.0, d=0.05, r=0.05, T=0.083,
the initial value for N = 1, the initial value for g = 1, initial wage
=1. The latter thresholds are distinguished by a prime.
The effect of the expectation of an adverse demand shock makes the hiring threshold
steeper and the firing threshold flatter. In the benchmark scenario, the hiring threshold is
comparatively flat in relation to the firing threshold, whereas in the downturn scenario the
firing threshold is comparatively flat. In this way the negative effects of firing costs on hiring
are increased in the downturn scenario while any beneficial effect on firing is reduced. We
conclude that firing costs lose some of their effectiveness under this scenario.
The intuition behind the results is straightforward. When uncertainty primarily takes the
form of a constant probability of a net drop in demand – either because a negative shock is
more likely or because it is expected to be larger – the ability to change the timing of hiring is
worth much less than the ability to change the timing of firing; by waiting, the firm is much
more likely to gain valuable information about the optimal timing of firing than about the
optimal timing of hiring. For this reason, the firing option is much more valuable than the
hiring option.
As firing costs increase, the option value of firing falls as it becomes more expensive to
dismiss workers. Firing costs now have only a muted effect on the total cost of firing
because the indirect cost of firing – the sacrificed firing option – is reduced which offsetts
some of the the direct effect of the firing costs. As a result, the firing threshold becomes
relatively flat.
However, the slope of the hiring threshold is affected in the opposite way. When a fall in
demand is expected, firms are hesitant to hire a new worker unless they think they will be
able to fire him later. Higher firing costs make it difficult to fire workers and this reduces the
value of the firing option and hence the benefit from hiring. As a result, the hiring threshold
becomes steeper.
In sum, firms hesitate longer before hiring new workers when the level of firing costs is
increased because the loss in the event of a bad shock – leading to the dismissal of some
workers – is going to be greater. However, when the bad shock hits, firms will not hesitate
before firing workers because they put a lower value on the firing option due to the higher
costs of firing. It follows that the use of employment- protection legislation is not likely to
help since it will primarily reduce incentives to hire workers. Empirical results by Davis et al.
(1996) give empirical support for these results; rates of job destruction were not
systematically lower in countries with higher employment protection, they were no higher in
Europe a than in the United States.7
                                                
7 Blanchard and Portugal (1998) compare job flows in Portugal – high employment protection – and the
United States – low employment protection. They find that the annual rate of job creation in
manufacturing (adjusted for differences in firm size) is higher in the U.S. while the rate of job destruction
is very similar. This is in accordance with our model under the downturn scenario.
Figure 2 describes how the employment effect of firing costs depend on the rate of
productivity growth. In particular, it shows the benchmark and the low-productivity-
growth scenarios. Importantly, we let wages grow at the same rate as productivity in both
scenarios. The fall in the expected rate of growth of labour productivity also makes the firing
threshold flatter but now without visibly affecting the slope of the hiring threshold. Again,
firing costs become less effective at deterring layoffs.
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Figure 2. The low-productivity-growth scenario. The effect
of firing costs on the hiring- and firing thresholds with parameters
corresponding to high growth of labour productivty (hg =0.025)
and low growth (hg =0.01). Other parameters: l1 = l2 = 0, sZ
=0.12, hZ =0.0, d=0.05, r=0.05, T=0.083, b = 0.5. Initial value for
N = 1 and initial value for g = 1, w =1. The latter thresholds are
distinguished by a prime.
The question arises whether wage growth can realistically be expected to respond
immediately to changes in the rate of labour productivity growth. One popular
macroeconomics textbook discusses the implications of a slow realisation of changes in
productivity (Blanchard (1999)). Measures of productivity growth tend to be very volatile
and for that reason it may take time for workers and firms to realise that the trend rate of
productivity growth has changed. A related argument can be found in a recent paper by Ball
and Moffit (2001). Here the rate of technical progress shapes wage aspirations or wage
norms. Workers gradually get used to and as a result learn to expect a given rate of wage
increase. As a result, wage growth only adjusts to changes in the rate of productivity growth
with a long lag since wage growth depends on the evolution of social norms which give the
“fair” rate of wage increases. If these norms only reflect productivity growth with a lag then
so do also wages.8
Relaxing the assumption that wage growth adjusts to changes in the rate of growth of
productivity does not affect our results in Figure 2: the slopes of the two sets of thresholds in
the low-productivity-growth scenario would remain the same. However, if wages continue
to grow at rate 2.5% both the hiring and the firing thresholds will be positioned at a higher
level than when they grow at rate 1%. Therefore, firms are less keen to hire and more willing
to fire when wages continue to grow at rate 2.5% in spite of a slowdown in the rate of
productivity growth. But our measure of the effectivenss of firing cost would be unaffected.
We conclude that at the aggregate level, firing restrictions may have little adverse effects
on employment and possibly even a positive effect when productivity is growing and the
possibility of large adverse demand shocks remote – provided that these firing restrictions
do not lead to a sufficiently large wage increases (and that is a big if!) when workers’
bargaining power is enhanced (see Lindbeck and Snower (1988)). This could possibly
explain why many European countries’ relatively stringent job security measures appear not
to have had significant adverse employment effects in the first two decades following World
War II. But lower growth in the past two decades (Maddison (1987)) and the higher
probability of adverse shocks may have turned firing restrictions into a significant obstacle to
employment creation and a likely cause of high unemployment.
III. Empirics
The power of labour-market institutions in explaining cross-country differences in average
unemployment has been widely documented.9 In particular, average unemployment has been
found to be positively correlated with measures of the unemployment-benefit replacement
                                                
8 Another rationale for lagged wage responses to productivity is given by Manning (1991). He uses an
efficiency wage model to show that higher expected productivity growth – hence higher expected future
wage growth – makes workers value their current employment more which then allows firms to pay lower
(efficiency) wages. An increase in the rate of productivity will therefore not be followed by an
instantaneous rise in the rate of wage growth.
9 See.eg. Nicoletti et al.(2001), Fitoussi et al. (2000), Nickell and Layard (1999), Elmeskov et al. (1998),
Nickell (1998), Scarpetta (1996), Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1991), and Lazear (1990).
ratio, the duration of benefits, the density and the coverage of labour unions and, sometimes,
the cost of firing. We include a survey of the literature on the employment effects of firing
costs in Appendix II. In contrast, unemployment is inversely correlated with the degree of
union- and employer coordination and the level of active labour-market expenditures.
Fitoussi et al. (2000) use measures of labour-market institutions for the period 1983-
198810 as regressors in an equation explaining the variation in average unemployment in the
1980s in a group of 19 countries.11 They find significant coefficients for the institutional
variables.
Our model implies that the effect of institutions on unemployment depends on the
macroeconomic environment – something which is neglected in the empiricial studies cited
above. In particular, our theoretical model indicates that the adverse effect of employment-
protection legislation on employment should be greatest in periods of low growth and a high
likelihood of adverse demand shocks.
In order to test this hypothesis, we first estimate an equation relating average
unemployment to the institutional variables without taking the macroeconomic environment
into account. We estimate the equation using alternatively average unemployment for the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s to test for structural stability and report the results in the
table below. We use the average value of the institutional variables for 1983-88 in the first
three regressions and the average value for 1989-1994 in the last one.12
Our results are strongest for the 1980s and the 1970s. For the 1980s, all variables have
signficant coefficients with the expected sign and the equation explains close to 80% of the
variation in unemployment. Most importantly, our measure of firing costs has a significant
positive coefficient. The results for the 1970s go in the same direction but are slightly
weaker, i.e. the coefficient of firing costs is now insignificant at the 5% level. The results for
the 1960s and the 1990s are still weaker. In particular, firing costs do not have a significant
                                                
10 Constructed by Nickell and Layard (1999).
11 These are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S.
12 We acknowledge that the stringency of firing restrictions has not remained constant over time,. It
increased after the oil-price shock in the mid 1970s (e.g. the U.K., the Netherlands and Sweden) and
decreased in the early 1980s in many OECD countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the
U.K.). However, the timing of changes has been quite uniform across countries and there is perhaps
little reason to believe that these changes have affected the relative rankings.
coefficient at all in the 1960s. We can also reject the hypothesis that the coefficient has the
same value for all four decades.13
The analysis in Section II of this paper suggests where to look for an explanation for the
varying significance of the firing cost variable. In particular, the adverse effect of firing costs
should be greatest in those countries having low rates of growth of productivity and facing
large negative shocks to demand. We now pool the data for the four decades and use
interactive terms to model the coefficient of firing costs. We first report the results of the
pooled estimation without any interactive terms in column (5) where firing costs have an
insignificant coefficient. We then let the value of the coefficient c depend on the level of trend
growth of productivity in a given decade and the magnitude of the largest decline in real
GDP during the decade,
tt scgccc 210 ++=                                           (19)
where g is the average annual rate of growth of labour productivity14 during decade t and s
denotes the largest proportional decline in real GDP during the decade. The results are
reported in column (6) of the table.
In column (5) all the institutional variables have statistically insignificant – although
correctly signed – coefficients. Allowing for the dependance of the effect of firing costs on
trend productivity growth and the possibility of adverse shocks (equation (19)) then
improves the equation considerably as can be seen in column (6). The equation now
explains close to half the variation in the sample and the coefficients have gained some
significance. Most importantly, the coefficients c1, c2 and c3 in equation (19) are all correctly
signed and significant at the 5% level. Firing costs are positively correlated with
unemployment in the absence of productivity growth and negative shocks. When we allow
for shocks, we find that the larger was the biggest decadal fall in real GDP, the higher is the
value of the coefficient of firing costs; a given level of firing costs causes unemployment to be
higher. In contrast, the coefficient of firing costs is inversely related to trend produtivity
growth. The higher is the growth of labour productivity, the smaller is the (positive) effect of
firing costs on unemployment.
                                                
13  F= 18.90 for H0: The coefficient is the same for all decades. This gives a rejection at the 5%
confidence level.
14 Measured as real GDP per employed worker and smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing
                                                                                                                                           
parameter equal to 100).
Average Unemployment and Labour-Market Institutions
1960-69
(1)
1970-79
(2)
1980-89
(3)
1990-99
(4)
Pooled
(5)
Pooled
(6)
Constant 4.50
*
(3.57)
5.31*
(3.28)
5.02*
(2.00)
2.81
(0.67)
7.15
(3.71)
6.76*
(3.98)
Replacement ratio 0.01(0.99)
0.03*
(2.55)
0.12*
(2.95)
0.06
(0.86)
0.04
(0.87)
0.04*
(1.77)
Duration of benefits -0.50
*
(2.53)
-0.34
(1.38)
0.79*
(2.13)
1.30*
(2.13)
0.13
(0.55)
-0.16
(0.60)
Employer
coordination
-0.30
(0.58)
-0.58
(1.02)
-3.95*
(3.46)
-2.34
(1.00)
-0.96
(0.57)
-2.17*
(2.47)
Union coordination -1.50
*
(1.81)
-2.31*
(2.70)
-3.06*
(2.35)
-2.76
(1.49)
-2.00
(1.32)
-1.13
(1.02)
Union density+union
cov.
0.04
(1.67)
0.06*
(1.79)
0.08
(1.68)
0.11*
(1.75)
0.02
(0.61)
0.03
(0.88)
Labour-market
expenditure
-0.04*
(2.01)
-0.06*
(2.46)
-0.09*
(2.14)
-0.07
(1.33)
-0.02
(0.47)
-0.05
(1.16)
Firing costs
0.23
(0.82)
0.43
(1.40)
1.93*
(3.28)
2.76
(1.68)
0.54
(1.18)
2.05*
(3.31)
Firing
costs*growth
-0.25*
(2.27)
Firing
costs*largest
adverse shock
0.26*
(3.01)
R2 0.62 0.63 0.79 0.48 0.12 0.43
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.39 0.65 0.14 0.03 0.35
Observations 19 19 19 19 76 76
* denotes significance at 5% level. Source: Author’s calculations using data supplied by Richard
Layard and Stephen Nickell. The table shows regressions of the form; eba ++= Ytu , where ut is the
average unemployment rate in a given decade and Y is the set of explanatory variables. The institutional
measures15 are averages for the nineteen countries for the period 1983-1988 – first three columns – and
1989-94 – fourth column. Growth measures average trend growth of labour productivity over a decade –
measured as real GDP per employed worker – and the largest adverse shock to GDP is taken to be the
largest rate of decline in aggregate real GDP between any two years during the decade.
                                                
15 The replacement ratio is defined as the ratio of unemployment benefits to wages; the duration of
benefits is the maximum number of months that workers can collect unemployment benefits; union
density measures the proportion of the labour force belonging to labour unions; union coverage shows
the proportion of the labour force covered by union wage settlements; union- and employer
coordination are indices for coordination among different unions and employers during wage
bargaining; labour market expenditures is expenditure on active labour market programmes per
unemployed person as a percentage of output per person; and, finally; firing costs are measured by the
number of months salary that goes into mandatory redundancy payments. Source: Nickell and Layard
In order to illustrate our results further we plot the coefficient of firing costs as a function
of the average rate of growth over the decade and the size of the largest recession in Figure
3.
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Figure 3. The effect of firing costs on unemployment. The
coefficient of firing costs shown as a function of the average rate
of growth of productivity and the magnitude of the largest
recession – measured as the largest proportional fall in real GDP
– over a decade.
The question remains if changes in firing costs, productivity growth and the size of
anticipated shocks can account for differences in the change in average unemployment over
time across the nineteen countries. We have measures of firing costs for both the period
1983-1988 and 1989-1994. We can use these measures, as well as data on productivity
growth and the size of the shocks in the two decades, to predict changes in average
unemployment between the 1980s and the 1990s.16 The results are shown in Figure 4.
                                                                                                                                           
(1999).
16 The formula is the following where g denotes productivity growth and s the size of the largest
negative shock,
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Figure 4. Predicted and actual change in average
unemploy-ment 1980-89 to 1990-99. The prediction is based
on the coefficient of firing costs reported in the table above and
shown in Figure 3.
The equation does a good job at explaining the rise in unemployment as can be seen from
the high correlation between the predicted and the actual rise in unemployment (0.62).
IV. Conclusions
Macroeconomic outcomes reflect the interplay of institutions, macroeconomic shocks and
policy responses. It follows that one should not study macroeconomic policy without paying
attention to the institutional environment: A given set of policies may be appropriate in one
country and not in another due to institutional differences. Similarly, institutional reforms –
such as those recommended by the OECD – may be sensible in a given macroeconomic
environment and not in another. We conclude that a sensible formulation of structural
reforms requires understanding of the interplay between institutions, the nature of cyclical
shocks and the level of labour productivity growth. We hope this paper contributes to this
understanding.
We have found that firing costs have an adverse effect on employment in a
macroeconomic environment where the rate of productivity growth is low and large negative
shocks are expected. A failure to take this interaction into account may help explain the lack
of consensus among authors on the effect of employment protection on unemployment and,
much more importantly, lead to incorrect policy recommendations.
Appendix I
Derivation of Equations (12) and (13)
The general solution to equation (11) has the same component as the complementary ones.
That is, the general solution has the following functional form
( )bgZAv = .                                                  (A1)
This gives the following relationships
h h bg g ggv v= ,                                                   (A2)
dNvN = 0 .                                                    (A3)
h h bZ Z ZZv v= ,                                                   (A4)
( ) ,1
2
1
2
1 222 vvZ ZZZZ -= bbss                                         (A5)
( )[ ] ( ) .11 11 vZv bff -=-                                              (A6)
( )[ ] ( ) .11 22 vZv bff +=+                                              (A7)
Substituting (A2), (A3), (A4), (A5) (A6) and (A7) into (10) in the text gives
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) 0=11111
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Equation (A8) must hold for any value of v, so that bracketed terms must equal zero:
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )drflflbhbhbbs bb +--++---++- 11111
2
1
2211
2
gZZ .     (A9)
Thus, (A1) becomes
( ) ( ) 21 21 bb gZAgZAv += .                                        (A10)
where b1  and b 2  are the positive and negative roots of (A8).
The general solutions are equal to the value of the options to fire or hire the marginal
worker. When Z goes to infinity, the value of the option to fire has to go to zero. Hence A1
is equal to zero for the value of option to fire.17 Similarly, When Z approaches zero, the
value of the option to hire has to go to zero. Hence we set A2 = 0 for the value of option to
fire. The general solutions for the hiring and firing options have the following forms
respectively,
( ) ( ) 11,, bgZAgZNv GH = ,                                          (A11)
                                                
17 Note that b1 is positive and b2 is negative.
( ) ( ) 22,, bgZAgZNv GF = .                                          (A12)
Appendix II
Literature survey on the effects of employment protection
on unemployment
There is a growing literature – theoretical as well as empirical – on the effects of employment
protection legislation on both the variance of unemployment as well as the average level of
employment and unempoloyment.
Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola (1992) and Layard and Nickell (1998) show that
firing costs are likely to reduce unemployment turnover and make the unemployment pool
more stagnant. Blanchard and Portugal (1998) concur in their comparison of the Portuguese
and the US labour markets.18 However, they claim that the implications of lower turnover
for the average unemployment rate are unclear. In an earlier paper, Gavin (1986) finds that
the effect depends on the state of demand: Employment is raised when demand is low, but
decreased when demand is high. The net effect on average employment is indeterminate.
Interestingly, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) give a more definite answer. They show that due
to time discounting, the effect of firing costs on the firing decision should dominate their
effect on the hiring decision – firms discount the firing costs when making the hiring decision.
Holding wages fixed and exogenous, they show that the average level of labour demand is
likely to rise when the firing restrictions are made more stringent.
While the effect of EPL on labour turnover appears empirically to be well documented,
there is less agreement when it comes to the average level of employment and
unemployment. Lazear (1990) studies data on employment protection, employment,
unemployment and labour-force participation in 22 countries over a period of 29 years.19
He finds a significantly negative effect of EPL on the employment-population ratio and the
labour-force participation rate. Scarpetta (1996) finds an inverse relationship between firing
costs and the employment-to-population ratio using a panel of OECD countries. However,
Nickell and Layard (1998) claim that this result may be largely caused by low participation
                                                
18 However, studies of employment turnover (Bertola and Rogerson (1997) and Boeri (1999) find similar
job creation and job destruction rates across countries with different EPL regimes. This may suggest
more frequent job-to-job shifts in the rigid labour markets.
rates in southern Europe which also happen to have stict EPL. There is also limited
consensus on the effect of EPL on unemployment. While Layard and Nickell (1998) find no
such effect, Lazear (1990) found a significant positive effect, as did Elmeskov, Martin and
Scarpetta (1998) using the OECD summary index of formal employment protection.
However, Addison and Grosso (1996) find no significant evidence when using data similar
to those used by Lazear. Moreover, in an earlier paper, Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) point
out that the degree of enforcement of employment protection differs significantly between
Spain and Portugal despite similar summary indicators of the strictness of the legistlation.
DiTella and MacCulloch (1998) take this criticism seriously and use data based on surveys
of business people over the 1980s and find a positive relationship between EPL regulation
and unemployment. Finally, in a recent contribution, Blanchard and Landier (2000) show
that limited liberalisation – which makes fixed-term contracts easier to impliment – may
paradoxically raise average unemployment by raising turnover and unemployment among
temporary workers.
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